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Abstract 
 
This paper returns to Le Corbusier's account of ineffable space, 
a radiant space of pure energy, in order to develop the idea of 
spatial psychosis. In psychosis, the subject’s conceptual or 
symbolic framework – what Lacan calls the master signifier – is 
foreclosed to the subject. It is not repressed and hence 
unconscious, it simply does not exist for the subject. This paper 
elaborates the theory of psychosis in psychoanalysis and argues 
that perspective constitutes such a master framework. It argues 
that the perspective frame, in which space is always already 
organised for the viewer, is foreclosed to Le Corbusier and in 
its absence he is left with a dynamic fluidity that elides the 
familiar spatial territories of inside/outside, near/far, ….  
 
Ineffable space is not simply an other space type, but a break 
with the spatial discourse of architecture and the anticipated 
space of modernism. We usually regard space as a given (by 
definition we are in it), but the experience of Le Corbusier 
raises the spectre that our relation to space is contingent. The 
purpose of this paper is not to describe ineffable space (any 
description would be a falsification), but to trace the 
consequences for architecture and subjectivity of this 
contingency. 
 
The psychotic is able to make great leaps precisely because s/he 
is unable to use the conceptual frameworks that bind most of us 
to our desire. Psychosis has the potential to become a critical 
strategy for negotiating landscape-like mega-machine projects 
which threaten the agency of their inhabitants. 
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 3 
Psychosis and the ineffable space of modernism 
 
 
‘Then a boundless depth opens up, effaces the walls, drives away 
contingent presences, accomplishes the miracle of ineffable 
space.’ 
        Le Corbusier, New World of Space (1948) p.8 his italics 
 
‘This tells you to what extent one must avoid the illusion that 
language is modelled on a simple and direct apprehension of the 
real.’   
    Lacan, The Psychoses (1956-57) pp.117-8 
 
[Caption 01] 
 
Introduction  
Now, I don’t want to cure anyone, but if you ever wanted to 
contemplate an other relation to reality, you could do worse than 
look at psychosis. The invisibility of space and the psyche are 
two of the most salient features of reality. It is because they 
are invisible, that we are able to position ourselves in the 
world.1  
 
This paper is about Le Corbusier's concept of ineffable space, 
which he first put forward in the introduction of his book New 
World of Space (1948)2. Ineffable space is a refusal of the 
perspective model for space, and its transparent image, which 
marks a break with subjectivity as we usually construct it. 
Ineffable space has the unique characteristic that it does not 
position the viewing subject before a view. Despite the fact that 
architecture is the spatial art, no one in architecture has 
questioned the invisibility of space, or put forward a space that 
wasn’t. If space were not invisible, then nothing would have an 
appearance. When Giedion defines the three space conceptions – 
the Archaic, Classic, and Modern - that organise architectural 
and psychical history, he assumes they are all equally 
transparent to vision and motion. When Panofsky and Gombrich 
debate whether perspective is a symbolic form or the natural 
state of vision (they are both right, an example of Venturi’s 
                       
1
 Architecture and psychoanalysis share this extraordinary feature: 
their central objects of study – space and the psyche respectively – 
are not whole and not there. Lacan said that architecture was organised 
around emptiness, but he might as well have been talking about his own 
discipline. 
2
 Le Corbusier, New World of Space (Reynal & Hitchcock and the Institute for 
Contemporary Art; New York and Boston, 1948). Le Corbusier, first published 
this text as an article, ‘L’Espace Indicible’, in L’Architecture 
d’Aujourd’hui, January 1946, pp9–10. Its importance to him is evidenced by 
the fact that he republished it twice more, in Modulor 1 (1950) and Modulor 2 
(1955). There is also reference in Oeuvre Complète volume 5 to a paper called 
‘L’Espace Indicible’ from 1957, that Christine Boyer suggests was never 
written. 
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 4 
both/and) they take the transparency of the spatial image for 
granted. In their seminal paper on transparency, Rowe and Slutzky 
suggest that transparency – in particular the phenomenal 
transparency in the work of Leger, Juan Gris, and Le Corbusier - 
is one of the hallmarks of modernism. I shall argue that space 
and the subject are bound to each other to constitute what we 
usually call reality; and I shall speculate about the possibility 
of unbinding them. The entanglements of space and subjectivity – 
in other words, the relation between how we symbolise our world 
and our selves - is the central interest of this paper. This 
paper is part of a larger project to define in spatial terms the 
clinical categories of psychosis, neurosis, and perversion. 
 
[Caption 02] 
 
 
The ineffable – Le Corbusier  
First some quotes. ‘Ineffable space’ opens with a statement about 
our fundamental spatiality.  
 
‘Taking possession of space is the first gesture of living 
things, of men and of animals, of plants and of clouds,…. 
The occupation of space is the first proof of existence.’ 
[p7] Later: ‘…endowed with the sense of space, a faculty 
which psycho-technical methods seek to reveal.’ ‘…an 
incessant desire to take possession of space…’ p9 
 
Possession – Space is in me; a kind of incorporation; a kind of 
desire. 
Occupation – I am in space. Usually, it is a matter of position. 
Psycho-technical –space is understood through a hybrid 
psychoanalytic/ material analysis, an analysis that has the 
precision of technology, a whiff of the pyro-technical. 
 
Le Corbusier may be in this space, but it is easier to claim that 
this space is in him. If he is in it, he is in it without 
position.  
 
Le Corbusier's ineffable space is a radiant space of pure 
explosive energy, derived from his traumatic first encounter with 
the Parthenon.  
 
'Action Of The Work (architecture, statue, or picture) on 
its surroundings: vibrations, cries or shouts (such as 
originate from the Parthenon on the Acropolis in Athens), 
arrows darting away like rays, as if springing from an 
explosion; the near or distant site is shaken by them, 
touched, wounded, dominated or caressed.’ [p8] 
 
Action of the work – a dynamic relation to its surroundings. 
Vibrations cries shouts – an enigmatic ventriloquism. Space is an 
organ, a mouth. Acoustic = energy. Imagine the mouth-space of 
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 5 
Samuel Beckett: whose words have a kinetic efficacy. 
Arrows, darts, rays – like god in Annunciations, like St. Teresa 
in ecstasy. 
Touched, wounded, dominated, caressed – something Oedipal.  
 
[Caption 03] 
 
Readers of Le Corbusier will recognize the interjectorial style 
and idiosyncratic language that arcs back to his account of the 
Parthenon. He is picking up where Towards an Architecture (1923) 
left off. In ‘Regulating lines’ he wrote, '…rhythms apparent to 
the eye... resound in man by an organic inevitability.' [68] In 
‘Pure creation of the spirit’, the chapter about the Parthenon, 
'This sounding-board which vibrates in us is our criterion of 
harmony. This is indeed the axis on which man is organised in 
perfect accord with nature and probably with the universe,…' 
[192]. And 'If we are brought short by the Parthenon, it is 
because a chord inside us is struck...; the axis is touched.' 
[196] 
 
Le Corbusier scholars have interpreted his preoccupation with 
ineffable space as an attempt to synthesize the arts, and ineffable 
space as the emergent property of such a synthesis. In Le Corbusier 
and the continual revolution in architecture (2000), Charles Jencks 
says that the paper on ineffable space ‘shows how he was beginning to 
translate his... Ubu painting and sculpture into architecture.’ and 
interprets the forms of Ronchamp and Sainte-Baume as metaphors for 
‘acoustic dishes, or parabolic reflectors, listening to each 
other’[261] 
 
In Le Corbusier: Homme de Lettres (2011) M. Christine Boyer 
writes ‘By the mid 1930’s, Le Corbusier was well on his way 
toward a synthesis of the arts, expressed in his writings as a 
theory of “ineffable space” (espace indicible)’ [p427] She points 
to a key paper he published in 1936 called ‘Sainte Alliance des 
Arts majeurs ou le Grand Art en Gésine’ (‘Holy Alliance of the 
major Arts or the Grand Art coming into Being’). This is Boyer 
quoting the paper and her comment: 
 
‘“The work of art is a conscience which opens its door on 
something that is not in the house, but in its own 
landscape externalising itself in all directions outside 
of architecture, profound, to the faraway.” In other 
words, the work of architecture, as a formal expression, 
always provides a lyrical escape.’ [Sainte Alliance p91 
quoted in Boyer p427]  
 
Homme de Lettres ends with a section called ‘Ineffable Space’ as 
if ineffable space represented a kind of end point that was also 
a return to origins, a lyrical escape and return, the completion 
of a life that we all hope for. ‘In one sweep of the hand, Le 
Corbusier reaches backward and forward, drawing a line of 
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 6 
continuity from his first Purist paintings to the sculptural 
garden on the roof of the Unités…, from the lessons of Athens to 
those of Paris.’ [p684]3 
 
These familiar themes of synthesis and continuity, this appeal to 
the lyric, belie an extraordinary detail -  
 
‘Then a boundless depth opens up, effaces the walls, 
drives away contingent presences, accomplishes the miracle 
of ineffable space. [p8] 
 
A boundless depth - it resists representation.  
Contingent presences – the appearances of things; like you, the 
reader. 
The miracle - the whiff of divine intervention.  
 
We can ask what sort of space this is. I’d like to take Le 
Corbusier at his word, treat this statement literally (not 
phenomenally) because in matters of space, I am a realist. And 
here we come up against a problem.  
 
[Caption 04] 
 
 
the ineffable - what it is not 
It is easier to understand what the ineffable is not, than what 
it is. Lets put it in relation to its other: depth bound by the 
vanishing point. A boundless depth would be a space unbounded by 
the vanishing point that terminates every view. Every enfilade, 
coulisse, railroad track, or Haussmannian boulevard appeals to 
this point, but it is implied by the view of anything, including 
landscape and field space, including the most nomadic mat-
building flow-space by Archizoom. 
 
Space not bound by the vanishing point would not calibrate 
distance, or at least not calibrate it by size, and not calibrate 
it from a viewer. Walls would no longer appear to converge as 
they recede from the viewer. Things may still look farther way – 
Le Corbusier has not eschewed depth, only depth bound - but they 
achieve that look without getting smaller. We can assume that in 
the absence of the vanishing point, other attributes of space are 
                       
3
 Cf. Charles Jencks, Le Corbusier and the continual revolution in 
architecture (Monacelli Press; New York, 2000). M. Christine Boyer, Le 
Corbusier: Homme de Lettres (Princeton Architectural Press; New York, 2011). 
Boyer’s book is an exhaustive source book for Le Corbusier's letters and 
articles. She argues that Le Corbusier is trying to consolidate the figure of 
mathematician and the poet and the mathematical and poetic aspects of his 
work. The writings from the mid 1930’s leading up to New World of Space are 
marked by the frequent use of the words synthesis, alliance, and unite. Boyer 
also cites another key archival research project, Catherine de Smet, Le 
Corbusier: un architecte et ses livres [108]. 
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 7 
absent as well. Objects would no longer occlude each other, for 
in order to overlap, they have to be seen from a point of view. 
Everything would be equally present, which implies a kind of 
instantaneity. Le Corbusier may be in this space, but it is more 
likely that it is in him. He is either, paradoxically, nowhere in 
this space, or else he is everywhere in it, distributed across 
its glittering surface, the way the dreamer is distributed across 
the surface of a dream. As hallucinogenic as this may seem, it is 
closer to reality, for walls do not really converge and objects 
do not really get smaller as they get farther away from us. Space 
is not really organised for the viewer or its desire, not for me 
not for you. And it really is full of energy and motion. If a 
boundless depth is less illusory than a bounded one, perspective 
seems to turn us toward and away from reality in a single 
gesture.4 
 
[Caption 05] 
 
 
Perspective 
At this point we need to explain perspective. In Brook Taylor’s 
diagram from New Principles of Linear Perspective (1719/1811), a 
man views an object; it could be an altar at the end of a nave. 
Perspective is a projective technique for producing images. It 
draws a geometric relation between three things: a viewer 
standing at an eye point, an expanding view, (what, in Della 
Pittura (1436), Alberti quaintly called the pyramid of vision), 
and a transparent picture plane upon which the image of the view 
is projected. The projective geometry links the viewer to its 
image of a view, and defines the transparency of the image. In 
the image so produced, the object appears smaller, the surfaces 
receding from the eye point appear to converge on the vanishing 
point. The vanishing point is always opposite the eye; at the 
point of intersection of the line of sight and the picture plane. 
 
I stand in the nave – that Renaissance paradigm of space – 
viewing the altar and contemplating my proximity to salvation. We 
usually draw a perspective to construct a view to something we 
desire, and desire is a waiting game. The view has the from 
me/here to you/there semblance of a path that confers an implied 
temporality on space and desire, and that inscribes subjectivity 
into space the way it is inscribed in the subject-object form of 
language. Perspective allows us to share our views. You cannot 
have my images, but you can come to my position and see what I 
                       
4
 Freud described psychosis as a turning away from reality. It seems that, in 
matters of space, our relation to reality is defined by the trop of turning 
and it matters little which sense it has. Cf. Sigmund Freud, 'Splitting of 
the ego in the process of defense’ (1940/1938/1937), in Sigmund Freud, On 
Metapsychology: the theory of psychoanalysis. Angela Richards and James 
Strachey (eds.) (Penguin; London, 1991), p 463. This paper was unfinished at 
the time of his death. Psychosis is unfinished business. 
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 8 
see, or else I can snap a photo or sketch a picture and show you 
my view. We share views in the same sense that we share meanings, 
because there is a public language (of words, of pictures) for 
conveying it. In this sense, perspective is an agreement with 
others, and the objectivity of space is a kind of infinitely 
cross-checkable inter-subjectivity made possible by perspective. 
Perspective turns us away from reality but it does so in the 
service of something more important for consciousness; it allows 
us to construct a reality whose most significant aspect is that 
it is shared. Perspective space is no realer than ineffable 
space, it is simply more sharable. For all these reasons, we are 
signed up members of the perspective club, without which spatial 
discourse would be impossible. It has the compulsory force of 
language. 
 
Ineffable space is an explosion into a new form of space and 
subjectivity. We momentarily glimpse freedom from a space that 
confines us to views and positions, all manner of gluey 
subjective entanglements. It is too simple to say it is an 
integration of the arts because that assumes that it is about art 
and not what Le Corbusier said it was about, which is space. I am 
less interested in why it was proposed, than in what it does. By 
placing the subject into a view, perspective seems to be the 
formula for normal space, or at least the normally neurotic space 
of subject positions. Space surrounds me in a cosy container so 
that I can imagine walking down the nave to what I desire, and 
then tell you about it. The ineffable is not about something 
added to make a better space (more energy); nor is it a simple 
displacement (a voyage to somewhere exotic, like Le Corbusier's 
voyage to the orient). It is more like the same space, from which 
something has been removed. But it is not like the simple removal 
of an altar from a nave, which leaves the nave and the viewer 
untouched. Something is unbound. Whatever it is that binds me to 
space, seems no longer to operate. Whatever it is that binds me 
to me, seems no longer to operate. The exotic voyage quickly 
becomes old hat, but this same space, threatens to never contain 
me. 
 
[Caption 06] 
 
 
Psychosis  
The only other place we encounter such a radical repositioning of 
our relation to reality is in psychosis. The central narrative in 
the psychoanalytic discourse of psychosis is the case of Daniel 
Paul Schreber a distinguished German lawyer whose crisis began 
when was appointed to the high court. It was exacerbated by being 
unable to have children. He was convinced he was the only 
remaining man in a world of depleted grey men. He was tormented 
by divine rays that effeminised his body and interrupted his 
thoughts, so that he could repopulate the world with god’s 
children. His father was an disciplinarian whose correction 
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 9 
regime extended to body braces. The overriding image I have of 
Memoirs of my Nervous Illness (1903) is of a rain-lashed Schreber 
howling into the storm, closing windows, slamming shutters, 
drawing curtains, turning off lights. No number of architectural 
layers, succeeds in keeping God’s rays out, and Schreber in. 
Psychosis – or at least the delusions associated with psychosis - 
are a particular form of architectural disorder. In this 
vignette, architecture fails to draw the line between inside and 
outside, to regulate the border crossing, to maintain the 
container. 
 
Psychosis involves a disintegration of the self; and the highly 
structured delusions of the psychotic are an attempt to erect a 
defensive outside against this crumbling centre. Psychotics hear 
voices. They sometimes see things. They invent words. In the 
paper ‘Neurosis and Psychosis’ (1923), Freud writes:  
 
‘…neurosis is the result of a conflict between the ego and 
its id, whereas psychosis is the analogous outcome of a 
similar disturbance in the relations between the ego and 
the external world.'(p149) And then: ‘In regard to the 
genesis of delusions, a fair number of analyses have 
taught us that the delusion is found applied like a patch 
over the place where originally a rent had appeared in the 
ego’s relation to the external world.’(p151)5  
 
The delusions of the psychotic are like a patch placed on a rent 
in the subject’s relation to reality. The psychotic attempts to 
repair the world with a new one of their own making. It is a 
creative act. Lacan asks, what kind of relation between subject 
and world could Freud be referring to. His answer, a symbolic 
relation, the symbolic world. 
  
‘…you will see this from the context, it’s to a 
deficiency, to a hole in the symbolic, that [Freud] is 
referring, even if in the German text it’s the term 
reality that is used.’[p156]6 
 
 
Master signifier   Foreclosure 
The symbolic order does not work for psychotics. They hover 
somewhere between an unmediated reality and fantasy: what Lacan 
calls the real and the imaginary. The symbolic order comprises 
the great symbolic or conceptual systems that frame human 
                       
5
 Freud, 'Neurosis and Psychosis' in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. James Strachey (ed.) (The Hogarth Press 
and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis; London, 1924 (1923)), pp. 147-53. 
Henceforth The Standard Edition. 
6
 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses 1955-
1956 (Norton; NYC, 1993). All page numbers in Lacan refer to The Psychosis, 
unless otherwise noted. 
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 10 
relations and make them possible: language, religion, money, what 
the sociologist Durkheim called social facts. It should be clear 
by now that space – with its capacity to codify visibility in 
terms of desire, place, subject-positions, and other functions of 
subjectivity - has to be understood as one such. In Lacan's text, 
the master signifier is the lynchpin of the symbolic order, and 
it is the foreclosure of this signifier to the subject that is 
the structural deficit of psychosis. Foreclosure is Lacan's 
translation of Freud's verwerfung (disavowal, repudiation in the 
SE), ‘the mechanism,… by means of which the ego detaches itself 
from the external world.'[p153] It is not repressed and hence 
unconscious, it simply does not exist for the subject. The 
foreclosure or loss of this signifier leaves a hole in the 
symbolic order for the subject. ‘Psychosis consists of a hole, a 
lack, at the level of the signifier.’[p201]  
 
The master signifier is an uber-signifier that binds the subject 
to its own discourse. It marks a position that orients each of us 
in the field of the Other.[pp223,224] In The Psychoses 
(1957/1993), Lacan builds the concept by condensing several 
terms, including the-name-of-the-father (le-nom-du-père), the 
law, ‘the law of the signifier’[P223], the paternal metaphor, the 
primordial signifier instituted by myth ‘aimed at installing man… 
in the world’ [P200], Freud’s dead father that ties us to the law 
[E464-65]. He calls this operation metaphor. Lacan links it to 
Freud's account of the Oedipal complex according to which the 
child emerges from the Oedipal complex by assuming the name of 
the father, in other words, by internalising the capacity to act 
with his authority and desire. The name is important because it 
indicates the symbolic aspect of this authority, on a par with 
the Ten Commandments or when the police say, I arrest you in the 
name of the law. Symbolic as opposed to real authority, like a 
gun, or imaginary authority, a threat.7 
 
Lacan may have developed his thinking on the master signifier by 
a close reading of Freud’s Oedipal complex (to speak with the 
authority and desire of the father), but its reach extends to the 
                       
7
 There seems to be no basis in linguistics and semiology for a 
hierarchy of signifiers such that we could distinguish master 
signifiers; Emile Benveniste does not mention them in Problems in 
General Linguistics. In Saussure, signs are in differential relations 
to each other; each sign is simply different from each other one. It 
may be a semantic effect. Lacan calls the master signifier a paternal 
metaphor, and metaphors are usually understood to be a function of 
meaning. This has an intuitive logic: certain words rally discourses 
around them, organise our speech, condense meaning, and begin to 
function within a limited territory as masters: freedom in American 
political discourse, sustainability is the discourse of development. 
Everyone seems to own them, and they become drained of content even as 
they condense it. The efficacy of these words is in inverse proportion 
to their truth (the worst polluters are now sustainable; BP, the master 
of non-renewable resources, runs ‘green’ adverts). 
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 11 
subject’s efficacy in language, language which is both the source 
of its power and the limits of it. To my mind, the most important 
aspect of the master signifier has to do with agency. This is a 
structural as opposed to semantic function. The master signifier 
yokes me to my voice the way the perspective apparatus yokes me 
to my images. It makes my speech mine. Foreclosure involves a 
catastrophic loss of agency. I lose my voice and hence my power. 
The effect of psychotic delusion is to re-construct what should 
have been an internalised agency, in the world. We have glimpsed 
Schreber’s disrupted relation to authority, paternal, legal, and 
religious. Typically the psychotic hears voices, and attributes 
it to others or to the environment. Lacan quips that everyone 
hears their own voice, its just that the psychotic cannot tell 
that it is theirs. The psychotic does not attribute their voice 
to themselves, not because they mistaken it for someone else’s, 
or don’t hear very well, but because the relation that binds the 
subject to its own voice does not exist.8 
 
 
Perspective – master signifier 
I just said the master signifier yokes us to our voice the way 
the vanishing point and picture plane yokes us to space. The 
perspective frame organises our visual experience so that we can 
be effective spatial agents. Although to my mind, the perspective 
frame is the most coherent model for the master signifier, Lacan 
did not make this claim.9 I want to argue that the perspective 
frame functions as the master signifier for space because I want 
to argue that ineffable space shares with psychosis the 
structural deficit of foreclosure. The perspective frame, in 
which space is always already organised for the viewer, is 
foreclosed to the inhabitant of ineffable space, and in its 
absence s/he is left with a dynamic fluidity that elides the 
                       
8
 The authority with which I speak, is not about mastering a subject 
matter, but about mastering my voice. This mastery is not only an 
effect of symbolic attachment, but also of position. According to 
Lacan, the master signifier positions me in the field of the other. My 
authority to speak cannot be disengaged from the position I hold vis-à-
vis others, who grant that authority by agreeing to listen. I stand 
before you, this man, speaking, and we cannot dissociate the man from 
the speech. I speak in my name because it was the name I took up and 
internalised from my masters, and I convey to you something of my own 
agency and power, which cannot be disentangled from you. This agency 
and power is collectively held. 
9
 When Lacan developed the idea of the master signifier in the 1950’s, 
he does not mention perspective, even though perspective seems to be 
the best model for the master signifier. He explains it with similes 
like the highway that ‘bundles’ local roads.  Perspective structures 
our views, and thereby allows us to be effective spatial agents, but it 
has no claim on the content of those views. Although most discussions 
of the master signifier dwell on the semantic, to my mind (I am a 
formalist), the structural function of the master signifier is more 
important. 
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familiar spatial territories of the view, of inside/outside, 
near/far, fore- mid- and background…. This is an appeal, not to 
reason, nor to evidence, but to the understanding. 
 
What conception of space and fluidity is at work here? Space is 
the field of images (all possible images of all possible 
viewers). We don’t usually think of space as a field of images, 
we think of it as space, but space – space itself – like the 
psyche, is a big fat nothing. If you want to know what space is, 
close your eyes and stick your tongue out the window. It is not a 
question of what space is really like, as if we could strip away 
the layers of paper and get back to bare walls - we are always 
already papered - but of how others represent space to us, by 
words images and buildings; and thereby put it into circulation.  
 
The lesson of psychosis and foreclosure is that experience for 
the subject is not a simple matter of fact. We do not experience 
the world simply because we have a body with a sensory surface. 
It requires an attachment. We have to bind ourselves to our 
images. We do it with a universally shared conception of space 
called perspective. Perspective binds images to each other to 
create coherent spatial discourses, like well-formed plans, and 
integrated design projects; and it bind subjects to images to 
construct their spatial experience. It says that experience will 
take a certain form, and have a certain relation to the subject 
of experience. Experience will take the form of a flow of images 
of views, although it has no claim on the content of those views. 
Our images have to be joined up and they have to be significant 
for us. We have to be able to distinguish them from the rest of 
the world. We have to have an account of the image that 
approximates the signifier, the visual signifier. 
 
Psychoanalysis is the study of how language flows through the 
subject. Freud defined this flow in his work on the free 
association of words in analysis, matched by the free floating 
attention of the analyst. He related it to the condensation and 
displacement of dream images. Words and images either replace 
each other or get sticky together.10 They have a kind of natural 
affinity which goes on happening even when we are not paying 
attention. Lacan said time and again the unconscious is 
structured like a language and the unconscious is the field of 
the other. For Freud, we are a conduit for language; for Lacan, a 
signifier machine. We do not have the space to look at their work 
on language, but it goes right to the integrity of the subject, 
for this continuous flow constitutes the principle of continuity 
of the subject. Space is not a language, but we are here to 
sketch the idea that space is a flow of signifiers. We are 
intensely spatial. We take possession of space; we occupy it. So 
                       
10
 One of our PhD students, Cameron McEwan, is working on the link 
between Aldo Rossi’s concept of analogical thinking in Architecture of 
the City, and Freud's work on dreams. 
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wrote Le Corbusier. As in language, we are awash in space and 
space flows through us. Lacan coined the term extimate (= 
intimate + exterior) to denote this in you more than you 
relation.11  
 
We can see how this works by reference to Taylor's diagram. As a 
model for vision (which it purports to be) as opposed to simply 
an instruction about how to make realistic pictures, perspective 
depends for its intelligibility upon a series of equivalences. In 
Taylor's tablet, the object is in three places at once: in the 
view, on the tablet, in the eye of the beholder. The image is in 
two: on the tablet and in the eye of the beholder. Note the 
raised hand. The image is out there in the world and in the eye. 
My images are in me, but only in the sense that they are attached 
to me symbolically. It is the same with language.12  
 
[Caption 07] 
 
To make a long story short, did you ever wonder what would happen 
if you took Taylor’s tablet away? I think that’s what has 
happened with ineffable space. What is at stake is nothing short 
of the intimacy and integrity of the I: the I who speaks and the 
I who sees (all puns intended). It seems easy to remove Taylor's 
image because it is drawn as if it were a tablet. But it is not 
clear what would be left. When we take the image out of the 
context of projection, the image loses its transparency and the 
subject loses its location, as the single point of reception of 
experience to which the I refers. Unlike building materials, the 
transparency of the image is not a material fact, because it is 
always a question of transparent for who. My image is transparent 
for me because it is a projection of my view on the picture 
plane. It might still be possible to speak of visual experience, 
but it is not clear in what sense that experience would be mine. 
If we return to ineffable space for a moment: Le Corbusier's 
cries and shouts are announced as if they were concrete facts. 
What could only be percepts, are detached from the percipiens.  
                       
11
 To say that space is the field of the other is to equate the spatial image 
with the signifier. To say that images function as signifiers is to attribute 
significance to images. Freud included words and images in this account of 
the unconscious. It is not to say that space is a language, which would be to 
claim that images are like words. Unlike words, images do not have 
definitions and are not organized in a grammar. For a discussion of the image 
as a visual signifier at least within the domain of cinema, cf. Christian 
Metz, 'The Imaginary Signifier', Screen, Vol. 16, no. 2, 1975, pp. 14-76. 
12
 In order to extricate himself from an impossibly figurative language, 
Lacan repositioned the architecture distinction inside/outside to the 
subjective one symbolic/real. Only in a figurative sense could you say 
desire is in us, because desire does not have the logic of position. 
The crumbling world of the psychotic is not interior, nor is the one he 
rebuilds a new exterior. Closing doors and windows does not work for 
Schreber. The psychotic’s symbolic relation to his/her world is 
crumbling. S/he replaces it with a new reality, a new certainty. 
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Imagine having someone else’s images. Or seeing this room from a 
position elsewhere than where you are.13  
 
[Caption 08] 
 
Imagine if all these signifiers which are not space but images of 
space and which are, at least in a naïve sense, in me, were drawn 
out of me. As if my spatial experience, which I represent to you 
as photographs, really were photographs for me too, blowing in 
the wind. I would have no control over them, even though they 
seemed to exhibit agency. I would begin to disperse, and my 
images would begin to harden, to thicken, to become real. To 
replace me in the world. This process of concretisation and 
exteriorisation of the image, of myself, others might notice it 
happening to me, but how could I notice it? Lacan has a way to 
understand this: ‘…whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in 
the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real.' [p13] When we 
contemplate the possibility of decoupling ourselves from space, 
we realise that space is not a stable pre-existing thing from 
which we are now cast adrift, but that the perspective couple had 
no small part in constituting both ourselves and our space. We 
are faced with the Kantian conundrum of things-in-themselves. 
Ineffable space is perfectly possible, possible in the sense of 
being conceivable, but if it were to obtain, the I would not be 
here to see it.14 
 
[Caption 09] 
 
 
Conclusion… 
The aim of this psychoanalytic reflection on architecture has 
been to disengage the spatial image from space, and thereby to 
reclaim for space its symbolic and contingent status. Space for 
the subject is the flow of signifiers to which we are yoked by 
the perspective apparatus. Whatever is real about space – the 
remainder of emptiness and energy – is for better or worse beyond 
our experience, not because it is impossible, but because it 
makes the I impossible. Lets trace this conclusion several ways. 
 
                       
13
 When Caillois described a spatial form of psychical collapse, he reported 
patients who claimed to see the space they are in but could not locate 
themselves in it. Or who feel invaded by space, as if space failed to 
localise and individuate them. Cf. Roger Caillois, 'Mimicry and Legendary 
Psychasthenia' (1935), translated and reprinted October Vol. 31, 1984. Lacan 
intimated the possibility of the percept without a percipiens in 'On a 
Question Prior to any Possible Treatment of Psychosis (1958)', in Ecrits: the 
first complete edition in English. (W W Norton; New York, 2006), pp. 445-88. 
 
14
 The neo-Kantian, Peter F. Strawson articulates a similar position in 
Individuals: an essay in descriptive metaphysics (Methuen/Doubleday Anchor; 
New York, 1959/1963).  
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…radical break  
Ineffable space is not simply an other space type, but a break 
with the spatial discourse of architecture and the anticipated 
space of modernism. We usually regard space as a given (by 
definition we are in it), but the experience of Le Corbusier 
raises the spectre that our relation to space is contingent and 
symbolic. It could have been otherwise. It may be based on an 
optical reality that we share with non language-based life forms 
like dogs, but it is the significance of that reality for us that 
is at stake. This paper has not attempted to describe Le 
Corbusier's ineffable space (any description would be a 
falsification) or to trace its lineage (purist painting, the free 
plan, the radiant city, the radiant farm), but to trace the 
consequences for architecture and subjectivity of this contingent 
and symbolic relation. 
 
[Caption 10] 
 
Modernism has been defined by breaks and subsequent re-
continuities that it has had to negotiate with its pasts. What is 
so radical about a boundless depth is not that it suggests an 
alternative image of space, a new style perhaps, but that it 
decouples spatial experience from the subject. Ineffable space 
marks a break with reality more absolute than any stylistic or 
ideological break based on new materials and technologies, 
conquests, and revolutions. I am aware of no others, although 
Beckett tarries in the same territory. More work needs to be 
done, perhaps a project that builds a typology of breaks. In 
present the case, it is clearly an unrealised break. It is hard 
to imagine such a break ever being more than a brief eruption, a 
glimpse. A break depends for its intelligibility upon the 
continuity of an attendant subject, and it is this continuity 
that is called into question. This is perhaps the aspiration – 
lets call it the modernist gesture - that defines modernism and 
gives it its hard edge. It will go on happening, because it can 
never succeed.  
 
The paper sheds light on the observation that the 20th Century 
falls under the sign of psychosis (Georg Simmel, Al Alvarez, Rem 
Koolhaas, Deleuze+Guattari). These authors point, not simply to 
the violence of the 20th C, its oneiric extremism, its delusional 
politics, its problematic disengagements with the past, its over-
valuation of the new, the rise of the machine which is a 
signifier for both psychosis and modernity,… but to an inner 
disintegration that seems part and parcel of the creative process 
of 20th Century thought and action. This paper has been able to 
make these general observations precise for architecture, by 
delineating the mechanism of this disintegration in foreclosure; 
in the particular case of Le Corbusier, the foreclosure of the 
perspective model for space and subjectivity, which may go some 
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way toward explaining the enduring relevance of Le Corbusier in 
contemporary thought. 
 
[Caption 11] 
 
This paper is an extension of my book, Brunelleschi Lacan Le 
Corbusier, which argued that Brunelleschi's invention of 
perspective and Le Corbusier's traumatic experience on the 
Acropolis mark the two poles of architectural spatial 
experience.15 We can only mark a break with something, modernist 
or otherwise, if it has already been symbolised (that’s why there 
are no revolutionary dogs). When Brunelleschi invented 
perspective, wittingly or no, he bound the viewer to a flow of 
images, to space, to a spatial agency. We can talk about the 
subject as something bound, tied, wrapped, sprung. He created the 
conditions for a future break, a future unbounding, and 
consequent explosive release of energy, and reordering of 
priorities and values. I do not claim that Le Corbusier was 
psychotic (although Rem Koolhaas did), but among all of the 
architectural inventions that were his legacy to the 20th Century, 
one of them was to reject the bounds of perspective for a new 
form of concrete and exterior subjectivity, a trajectory, that 
can never be fully realized as space because it can never be 
fully realized as subjectivity.16 
 
…resistance 
I am ambivalent about psychosis. I have called it a creative act 
and a catastrophic loss of agency. The psychotic is for 
Deleuze+Guattari (a doubled author, a split authority), the great 
figure of creativity in the fluid world of 20th C capital. They 
dismiss the Oedipal complex as an absurdity of Victorian Viennese 
conservative family values, but they maintain the figure of the 
psychotic as the action hero and creative agent of capitalist 
society and the desiring machine as one of the key metaphors for 
subjectivity. For Deleuze+Guattari, the master signifier is a no-
trespassing sign, that compartmentalises the world into discrete 
territories, and the foreclosure of the master signifier is a 
form of creative de-territorialisation, that shakes things up, 
allows new forms of thought and action.17 
 
                       
15
 Lorens Holm, Brunelleschi Lacan Le Corbusier: architecture space and 
the construction of subjectivity (London: Routledge, 2010). 
16
 Rem Koolhaas, 'Dali and Le Corbusier: the paranoid critical method', 
Architectural Design, Vol. 2-3, 1978. Also, Delirious New York: A Retroactive 
Manifesto for Manhattan (The Monacelli Press; New York, 1978/1994), the 
chapter ‘Europeans: Biuer! Dali and Le Corbusier conquer New York’, pp235ff. 
17
 A spatial shizo-analysis of Deleuze+Guattari has yet to be done. About the 
first and only architectural foray into this territory is Andrew Ballantyne, 
Deleuze and Guattari for Architects (Routledge; London, 2007). 
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A full-blown psychosis may be the best response to environments 
of total control where agency has been shifted not simply to 
others but to machines or to environments which, to us, are in 
effect machines, because we can only ever hope to be cogs in 
them. You relinquish authority to survive. This is a 20th century 
spectre. In architecture, Colin Rowe and Fred Koetter called it 
the city of total control. Lewis Mumford, that theorist of cities 
and technology called these environments – marked by an 
irresistible confluence of social, political, military, and 
ideological control - the mega-machine. Although this machine is 
of our own making, it operates with its own values and priorities 
that seem to reflect no one’s, not even the leader impaled at its 
apex. When capitalism becomes a system with no alternative 
(Slavoj Zizek argues this point), it becomes a mega-machine. The 
mega-machine is perhaps most virulent when power and agency are 
brought together with space, space which is everywhere and 
nowhere, within and outwith the subject. 
 
If we return to the proposition with which we began, that the 
invisibility of space and the psyche are necessary conditions for 
reflecting upon ourselves and our objects, we can see how a 
psychotic approach might resist regimes of pervasive surveillance 
and control. These regimes use an excessive visibility to 
threaten our sense of intimacy. Typically, they are figured in 
architecture by the Panopticon. They go to the heart of 
subjectivity because they are about positioning and visibility, 
and the consequent reformation of the intimate inside. If you 
fashion yourself as a psychotic, no one will want to watch you. 
Its not that you are too weird and smelly, its that your 
signifiers are bad. Cries shouts, vibrations. They may look like 
signifiers but they don’t seem to be yours or mine or anyone’s. 
This approach is the last stand of the psyche against an 
unremitting materialism. We exteriorise the signifier because we 
have lost control of ourselves and the material world.  
 
Faced with the threat of an aggressive visibility, we can either 
guard our intimacy by retreating into more invisibility, which is 
like hiding, we would eventually be found; or we can become more 
visible, we can forsake our intimacy by refusing the perspective 
conception of space that sponsors it. My intimacy to myself is 
the flip side of my visibility to others. We either conceal our 
desire by diverting the flow of signifiers (neurosis) or we 
construct it in the world (psychosis). The psychotic puts his 
desire out there in the world in a way that is absolutely real 
for him, but means nothing to others. We would experience our own 
visibility directly, but conversely, our visibility to others 
would signify nothing. It would mark the end of vision, not 
because, in some anatomical sense all our oppressors became 
blind, but because seeing others would be drained of its 
significance. If I am no longer seen by others to be a single 
point of agency and desire (hence a potential criminal), there 
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would be no reason to survey me. The surveyor will see my image, 
but no longer regards it as a me.  
 
We can see just what an absolutely grotesque betrayal of 
subjectivity is involved in aggressive and pervasive regimes of 
surveillance. I am firstly invisible to myself (always behind my 
view never in it), but visible to others. In Taylor's diagram, 
the subject is an invisible point of projection for itself and an 
image on a screen for others. My visibility, this essential 
aspect of my subjectivity, is in the hands of others. It is a 
precious agreement between each of us and others. It is not for 
nothing that space is the field of the other. Architecture is 
shared not because it is jointly owned but because it is spatial. 
We noted early that perspective allows us to share spatial 
experience. We now see that the inter-subjective aspect of 
perspective extends to our visibility. A panoptic regime is 
foisted upon us by government and corporations in the name of 
security. These aims are always poorly defined but well-supported 
by statistics. We acquiesce. We have no choice because although 
this regime is of our own making, it is bigger than us. What has 
been missed in this approach is that if there is a greater good, 
it is not security. It is to support - not abuse - the conditions 
that allow subjectivity to happen. In the face of this betrayal, 
all we can do is respond by finding new forms of subjectivity and 
visibility that do not go through other subjects.18 
 
[Caption 12] 
 
The machine aesthetic notwithstanding, I have no examples of the 
psychotic’s gambit in architecture. It is probably here but 
hiding. It would be the antithesis of the joined up urbanism we 
celebrate. It would be associated with an excessive individualism 
that – like Schreber - knows of no others. It would involve a 
knowing deterioration of the built environment coupled with a 
technical mastery in the erection of a shiny brave new one 
(symbolic disintegration, new reality). In either case, we would 
expect something whose significance was difficult to master. 
Something not recognised by architecture and its regulatory 
                       
18
 Lacan related perspective to desire in The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psycho-Analysis (Seminar XI), but does not to my knowledge relate it to his 
earlier work on psychosis. Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts… 
(Norton Press; New York, 1981), the section ‘Of The Gaze As objet petit a’, 
pp67ff. I discuss this section in my Brunelleschi Lacan Le Corbusier 
(Routledge 2010), the chapters ‘Intercession: a repetition on the gaze and 
voice of Brunelleschi’ pp131ff and ‘Desire, position, opacity and death in 
the visual field’ pp149ff. Wajcman and Jonckheere develop the concept of 
intimacy in their debate in the online journal S. See: Gérard Wajcman, 
'Intimate Extorted, Intimate Exposed', S - Journal of the Jan van Eyck Circle 
for Lacanian Ideology Critique, no. 1, 2008. And: Lieven Jonckheere, 
'Response: The Politics of “Atopia of the Intimate” in Contemporary Art: the 
view from Lacanian Psychoanalysis', S - Journal of the Jan van Eyck Circle 
for Lacanian Ideology Critique, no. 1, 2008. 
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regimes (RIBA, ARB, Bldg Regs, Highways Act, Town & Country 
Planning, Planning Advice Notes,…). The nearest I get is 
literature. With a technical mastery that is almost dizzying, 
Beckett has a way of distributing I across the surface of his 
text. It is a subterfuge. He knows that if he does that, the 
people who get pleasure out of surveillance will not read him.19 
 
 
…man the artefact 
Psychosis is a radical rethink of man the artefact. We can ask, 
how do we go on working on ourselves. How can we remake ourselves 
as machines, or how do we humanise these machines we are 
becoming. I refer not only to surveillance technology, but to 
increasingly pervasive medical technologies, the increasing 
medification (= modification + medication) of the mind, 
artificial intelligence, artificial language, artificial life, 
IT, IT networks, networks that resemble neural networks, 
prosthesis; all the things that augment human beings in material 
ways and by increments redefine both the human bit and the being 
bit. To the threatened individual, the me under siege, these 
initiatives always appear to come from Science or Big Pharma, in 
other words, from a Corporate Other. There are various ways to 
resist the this Other, to challenge it, to tarry with it. The 
psychotic approach would be to cease to be a signifier for it. 
 
The psychotic is able to make great leaps precisely because s/he 
is unable to use the conceptual frameworks that bind most of us 
to our desire and that determine our forms of thought. Psychosis 
has the potential to become a critical category with which to 
negotiate the complex of humanity (the intimate self) and 
institutions (Corporate Other) with their architectures and their 
increasingly pervasive technologies. I am thinking of landscape 
and landscape-like mega-machine projects which become total 
environments that elide the usual distinctions between self and 
other, interior and exterior, figure and ground in favour of 
continuity, porosity, event….  
 
We need to speculate about the possibility of an ineffable desire 
in architecture, or  
A desire beyond the symbol or  
A desire stripped of its neuroses or 
A desire fully realized, realized with no displacement, no 
deferring or temporizing… 
                       
19
 Beckett pushes the limits of subjectivity to breaking point. Witness 
for instance, Not I (1973), two stills of which are shown in this 
paper. Or the opening lines of Texts for Nothing IV (1951/1966), ‘Where 
would I go, if I could go, who would I be, if I could be, what would I 
say, if I had a voice, who says this, saying its me?’ Or the opening 
lines of The Unnamable (1952/1959), ‘Where now? Who now? When now? 
Unquestioning. I, say I’. 
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and although for the most part we go on not acknowledging it, 
trying in other words, to domestify and gentilify snapshots like 
Le Corbusier’s vision of ineffable space, it is perhaps the 
affinity between this desire in psychosis and 20th Century culture 
generally, that explains the overwhelming impact and reception of 
Le Corbusier's work in the 20th Century. 
 
[Caption 13] 
 
 
Friday 24 February 2012 
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CAPTIONS + IMAGES 
 
CECI N’EST PAS UN ESPACE INDICIBLE
Psychosis and the Ineffable Space of Modernism
 
01 title montage [Schreber, Le Corbusier, Taylor] 
 
 
 
02 cover to Le Corbusier, New World of Space (1948) -vs- Coulisse 
[Samuel Bourne] 
 
 
 
03 mouth><space = subject><position [Beckett, Not I] 
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04 field space [Archizoom] + a dream of shadows [Spelterini, aerial 
Cheops (1904)] + surface of space [Sugimoto] 
 
 
 
05 view space [Brunelleschi’s nave of San Lorenzo] + [Brook Taylor, 
New Principles of Perspective (1811)] 
 
 
 
06 arrows darting away like ecstasy [Bernini] + divine rays and 
ecstasy,… they make wonderful machines [James Tilly Matthews’ ‘The 
Air Loom’, illustrated in John Haslam, Illustrations of Madness 
(1810), a book documenting the schizophrenia of Matthews (1770-1814)]   
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07 remove the tablet in two steps 
 
 
 
08 images in the existential breeze [Jeff Wall, ‘A sudden gust of 
wind (after Hokusai)’ (1993)] 
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09 the thing becomes surface [Man Ray] + the word becomes concrete 
[Brassai] 
 
 
  
10 all that is symbol becomes real [Superstudio] all that is air 
becomes solid 
 
 
Page 24 of 26
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rjar
The Journal of Architecture
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 5 
 
11 Brunelleschi + the young Jeanneret [Holm, Brunelleschi Lacan Le 
Corbusier] 
 
 
 
12 machinic bodies and machinic environments: [Richard Lindner (1954) 
‘Boy with machine’ (the machinic body, frontispeice to 
Deleuze+Guattari, Capitalism and Schizophrenia); Archigram, ‘Electric 
Tomato’ (the networked body); Archigram, ‘Walking City’ (the machinic 
environment)] In these images, agency and desire have been oddly 
displaced, either to an outside or to an inside that is really an 
outside. What should be symbolic has been made real. 
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13 the image Le Corbusier published of ineffable space, which is, of 
course, anything but…. A linear space that wraps itself into an 
object. 
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